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INTRODUCTION 
Economists have had a long-standing concern with understanding and mod- 
eling the behavior of consumers, both in the narrow sense of their behavior 
as buyers of goods and services in product markets and as suppliers of 
services in labor markets, and in the broader sense of their collective 
purchases of public goods-schools and roads, air and water quality, na- 
tional security, etc. Analysis of these issue has been cast as a constrained 
optimization problem: Consumers are perceived as choosing a particular 
bundle of goods and services, or a combination of work and leisure hours, 
or a set of taxes and public goods, that represents the optimum mix subject 
to the constraints of income and prices. Optimum simply means that no 
change can improve matters, and what is being optimized is utility or 
satisfaction. 
This paper provides a brief history of the development of utility theory, 
and suggests a reconceptualization of the basic sources of utility. The new 
formulation extends the range of interesting and important phenomena 
encompassed by the theory, reexamines the role of goods and services in 
producing utility, and simplifies the conceptual structure-at the cost of 
complicating the measurement problem as well as the analytic properties of 
the system. Some recent data reflecting the new conceptual structure are 
examined, and we note some implications of the theory and data for both 
scientific and policy issues. 
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GOODS 
The original concept of utility, developed principally by the moral philoso- 
pher Jeremy Bentham’“) in the late eighteenth century and formally inte- 
grated into the analysis of economic problems by Jevons, Menger and 
Walras in the 187Os, was that is represented a cardinally measurable psycho- 
logical flow of satisfactions attached to goods and services purchased in the 
market-onsuming a mutton chop yields x utils of satisfaction or pleasure.? 
The utility function for the consumption of good x was presumed to be 
independent of the function for good y, and consumers were visualized as 
equating the utility of the last unit of each good purchased (the marginal 
utility) with its price. Thus the last dollar spent on housing or clothes or 
food yielded the same amount of satisfaction, since otherwise consumers 
could increase total utility by switching a unit of expenditure from one 
product to another. And marginal utility was a declining function of the 
amount of each good consumed: otherwise, consumers could move away 
from the “equal utility on the last unit of expenditure” position by switching 
a unit from some good to one whose utility was rising, thus increasing total 
utility. Eventually, unless marginal utility declined, consumers would wind 
up buying one commodity only-the one whose marginal utility was 
rising-which is counter to common observation.’ 
The idea of cardinally measurable utility, independence of the utility 
functions for different goods, and declining marginal utility gradually 
eroded as economists began to recognize that not only was there little 
scientific underpinning to the notion that consumers could make precise 
assessments of the psychological satisfactions associated with utility (or that 
psychologists had satisfactory theories that could explain utility), but more 
importantly, that the assumption of cardinally measurable utility was not 
essential to an explanation of economic behavior. Thus utility as a quantita- 
tive measure of psychological satisfaction began to be replaced by the 
simpler notion that consumers (for whatever reason) had preferences for 
one combination of goods over another, and that these preferences (or 
preference orderings) could be revealed by observing the choices that 
consumers made in the marketplace. It was still true that the term utility 
was often used to describe what consumers were trying to maximize in 
making choices, but it was only necessary to assume that consumers could 
make consistent choices-if A was preferred to B and B to C, consumers 
would necessarily prefer A to C. 
To replace the analytic apparatus that involved equality in the ratios of 
marginal utility to price, economists developed the notion of a generalized 
utility function (the utility functions for different goods weren’t necessarily 
independent) and of an indifference surface: Consumers were thought of as 
judging that various combinations of different products (more of one and 
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less of the other) were of equivalent utility, or that one combination 
produced more (or less) utility than another. The equilibrium conditions 
became ones where the marginal rates of substitution of one commodity for 
another (if I give up a pound of beef, how many quarts of beer are needed 
to make me equally welloff) had to be equal to the ratios of their prices 
(Edgeworth, Pareto,(s2.h3) Slutsky,(63) Fisher, (Ix) Hicks & Allen(24) and Sam- 
uelsonCh’)) .4 
The utility function implied by the preferences ordering notion had utility 
as a function of the consumption of goods and services as reflected by 
Equation l,s with total utility constrained by the total amount of goods and 
services that could be purchased with the consumer’s money income (Equa- 
tion 1.1). 
u = u(x,, x2, . . . XJ (1) 
where U is utility and the Xi are goods and services (service flows in the case 
of durable goods). 
n 
3 i= P+x, = I = w + v (1.1) 
where the pi’s are prices, Z is money income, W is earnings of household 
members, and V is nonwage income of the household. 
GOODS AND LEISURE 
The idea that utility was constrained by total money income, and that the 
utility maximization problem consisted of deciding which commodities to 
consume, given their prices and the household’s income, was significantly 
broadened when it became recognized that money income itself was a 
choice variable, and that consumers were really maximizing the utility 
derived jointly from a combination of goods and leisure (Robbins, (57) 
Hick@)). In effect, in earlier discussions, money income had been implic- 
itly treated as an exogenous variable, essentially given to the consumer unit. 
4 In later discussion, wage rates were the exogenous variable and money 
income was endogenously determined by the combination of the wage rate 
and the choice variable of work hours.’ Thus the utility function looked like 
Equation 2, in which consumers first had to make a choice about how much 
income to earn and how much leisure to consume. then decide on the 
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combination of goods and services to purchase with their money income. 
The constraints were that total money income fixed the total value of 
consumption (including future consumption or saving), and that total avail- 
able time fixed the sum of labor market hours and leisure hours-with 
leisure defined to include all activities except work for pay in the market. 
u = u(l,L) (2) 
where I: is total consumption (including saving for future consumption), and 
L is leisure time. 
c p+xj = I = WT, + v (2.1) 
where w is the wage rate and T,,, is labor market hours, and 
T=T,,,+L (2.2) 
It is worth noting that in these simple models, the utility function contains 
one item that reflects market choices (the consumption of goods and ser- 
vices) and a second that reflect nonmarket activities (the consumption of 
leisure). Thus the model has consumers supplying labor to the market up to 
the point where the income produced by the last unit of labor produces just 
enough utility to overcome the distaste for work. In effect, the model treats 
income as producing positive utility, leisure activities as producing positive 
utility, but work activity as producing negative utility, at least at the margin 
of choice.x 
Another interesting feature of these utility maximization models is that 
the earlier switch from cardinally measurable utility to ordinally measured 
preferences, while perhaps reflecting a more realistic assessment of the way 
consumers actually made choices,v also significantly modified the way in 
which economists thought about intertemporal (i.e., multiperiod) utility 
maximization. In the early (Bentham, etc.) theoretical structure, intertem- 
poral utility maximization was accomplished by including in the current 
period utility function a particular representation of future utility-the 
current pleasure obtained by contemplating (savoring) future consumption 
(Loewenstein, (42)). In that model, consumers could make choices about 
giving up current consumption to get consumption in the future, but all 
utility maximization took place during the current period: Future consump- 
tion yielded utility only in terms of the current satisfaction obtained from 
anticipation of a future event. 
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When preference ordering replaced marginal utility, intertemporal utility 
maximization took the form of consumers optimizing over time by equating 
(at the margin) the flow of satisfaction yielded by current consumption with 
the future flow of satisfaction yielded by future consumption, not by equat- 
ing the satisfaction from present consumption with the current satisfaction 
from savoring the prospect of future consumption. Thus economists 
thought of future consumption as yielding utility only when it actually took 
place, and since future satisfactions were generally thought to be worth less 
than current ones, they had to be discounted to reflect their futurity.“’ 
“COMMODITIES” AND LEISURE 
The notion that goods purchased in the market and leisure were the right 
way to think about utility functions was significantly modified by the house- 
hold production framework introduced by Becker in the middle 1960s 
(Becker,‘“) Mincer,c4’) Michael & Becker,(4s) Nerlove,(““).” Becker extended 
the notion of productive activity to include the proposition that households 
used elements of their own time as inputs to the production process, along 
with goods purchased in the market, to produce outputs (“commodities”) 
that were the ultimate objects of utility. Thus, time could be allocated 
directly to the market, where it yielded income and thus command over 
goods and services, it could be used within the household to produce 
commodities, or it could be used as leisure (treated as a commodity in the 
Becker framework). The ultimate sources of utility, in this model, were 
commodities produced within the household-meals, children of certain 
quantity and quality, going to plays, etc., which typically involved the joint 
inputs of market-purchased goods and services plus the household’s own 
time. 
These “commodities” could be thought of as having shadow prices-the 
cost of the market-produced input plus the value (wage rate) of the time of 
household members. Thus, certain types of commodities were expensive to 
produce for certain types of households+hild quantity and quality, for 
example, would be an expensive commodity to produce for households with 
highly-educated mothers, since the opportunity cost of their market time 
would be relatively high. And given family income, adults with high (actual 
or potential) wage rates would tend to stay away from time-intensive 
activities in favor of goods-intensive ones (e.g., they would play squash 
rather than golf), while low wage-rate adults would favor time-intensive 
over goods-intensive activities (e.g., they would serve as community volun- 
teers). 
In this model, it is still true that household well-being was a joint function 
of consumption and leisure. However, instead of the relevant goods being 
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only those produced in the market and reflected in, say, the Gross National 
Product, consumption was broadened to include a range of outputs that 
reflected nonmarket production as well as market production. Thus, a 
wider range of goods and services was included in the notion of commodi- 
ties. The formal structure is spelled out in Equations 3 to 3.3. 
u= U(Z,,Z&. .Z,) (3) 
where the Z; are commodities produced within the household with market 
goods xi and the time of household members t;. 
z, = z;(x;, t;, E) (3.1) 
which is the production function constraint on the Z;, given the xi, the t; and 
E (the household production technology). 
T = T, + 2, t; (3.2) 
where T, is time spent in the labor market at paid work and the t; represent 
all other time uses. 
S = wT + V = $, wt; + /I,_K; (3.3) 
where S is the “full income” of the household, w is the wage rate, and V is 
the nonlabor income. 
A major difficulty with this model was pointed out by Pollack and 
WachteF in 1975. They argued that the shadow prices in the household 
production model were indeterminate except under special conditions that 
were unlikely to hold. The household production function in which the time 
of household members is used to produce “commodities” specifies the wage 
rate as the cost of nonmarket production time. That specification assumes 
that consumers do not have any preference for the way in which their time is 
spent, quite apart from any preferences they may have for the output 
resulting from those inputs of time. Since the outputs and time use prefer- 
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ences are joint products of activity, Pollack and Wachter concluded that the 
system could not be uniquely solved for shadow prices, absent information 
about the intrinsic preferences of household members for time spent in 
various household production tasks. 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
These developments can be thought of as reflecting a broadening of utility 
theory in terms of the potential sources of human satisfaction. The focus on 
goods found in the eighteenth and nineteenth century writers came to 
include goods and leisure in the early twentieth century, and to include 
nonmarket “commodities” and leisure during the last few decades.” At the 
same time, there was a gradual but eventually complete stripping away of 
any notion that the theory had (or needed) any cardinally measurable utility 
content. It required only preference orderings that could be inferred from 
observed choices. 
While the ordinalist view of utility is clearly the dominant strain of 
thinking among economists, the idea of direct (cardinal) measurement of 
utility has always lurked uneasily in the background even when the more 
vocal (rigorous?) proponents of ordinality thought that it had been stamped 
out as unnecessary (on the Occam’s Razor principle) for models of consum- 
er behavior. Even Hicks, who along with Allen “slit the throat of diminish- 
ing marginal utility” (p. 4), came to think that (cardinally measurable) 
marginal utility was a better description of what consumers actually did than 
the idea of their equating marginal rates of substitution with price ratios.‘23) 
Stigler and Becker, hardly cardinalist heretics, revived the notion of house- 
holds as mini-factories producing a stream of utility@‘)--just like real facto- 
ries producing a stream of (cardinally measurable) profits? And Pollack and 
Wachter suggested that the shadow prices for “commodities” in the house- 
hold production framework could not be determined because these com- 
modity prices were not exogenous to any household that had (cardinally 
measurable?) preferences over their use of time in household production. 
This paper argues for the importance of direct (cardinal) measurement of 
utility, and outlines a conceptual framework in which such measurements 
play a central role. First, it is argued that a properly conceptualized utility 
theory implies measurements that cannot be inferred from behavior but 
must be obtained directly from consumers, and that this conceptualization 
can help to predict behavior that is not otherwise understandable. Second, 
the measurements suggested by this conceptualization relate directly to 
consumer well-being. Understanding what determines well-being, and how 
it is distributed among the population, is important in its own right indepen- 
dently of any behavioral implications. 
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UTILITY, ACTIVITIES, AND GOODS 
A little reflection (introspection, actually) on the nature of production and 
consumption, and on the characteristics of various sources of utility or 
satisfaction, provides some helpful clues about the utility maximization 
problem and how it might best be reformulated. Consumers do not gener- 
ally get utility directly from any of the goods and services purchased in the 
market and presumed to enter the utility function. The purchase of food, 
clothing, housing, automobiles, or theatre tickets does not do much for 
one’s utility, nor does cooking food, cleaning and straightening the house, 
using an automobile to get from home to the theater, or disciplining a child. 
But utility is obtained directly from activities like eating meals (where a 
level of utility depends partly on the quality of food), seeing a play (where 
the level of utility depends partly on the quality of the acting), entertaining 
friends in one’s home (where the level of utility depends partly on the 
quality of the home and its furnishings), taking one’s child on an outing, etc. 
This illustrative comments suggest some general principles about the 
relation between goods, activities, and utility. 
1. Utility flows are always derived from activities (eating, socializing, playing 
tennis, seeing a play, etc.). 
2. The amount of utility derived from an activity depends partly on the 
amount of goods associated with it (quality and variety of food, clothing, 
housing, sporting equipment, etc.). 
3. Some of the goods that influence the utility from activities are flows 
consumed during the activity (food, theater tickets), but many are capital 
stocks that yield service flows (housing, clothes, cars, TV sets). 
As illustrations, one presumably derives more utility from listening to a 
high quality recording of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony played on an equally 
high-quality sound system than from listening to the same notes played over 
a transistor radio, and the satisfaction from that experience is presumably 
influenced by whether one does the listening in a poorly heated room 
without much furniture than if it is done in the comfortable and well- 
appointed living room or den of an equally comfortable and well-appointed 
dwelling. The utility derived from eating meals presumably depends on the 
quality and variety of the food that goes into the meal. And so on. 
Are there aspects of utility that are not associated with activities of one 
kind or another? The answer seems to be yes. I do not necessarily have to 
be driving a Porsche, and thus obtaining satisfaction from the process, in 
order to derive utility from owning one. I do not necessarily have to engage 
in conversation or interaction with my wife or children to derive satisfaction 
from the existence of a strong family relationship. 1 am likely to be more 
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pleased about life generally if I think that the society I live in is charac- 
terized by equity in the tax laws, in the administration of justice, in the 
distribution of income, and by equality of opportunity. And so on. 
Can we systematize these illustrative notions about utility, how it is 
produced, and how it might be assessed? Perhaps. A system with these 
general characteristics has been outlined, at least in embryonic form by 
Juster Courant, and Dow. (“XX) The basic idea spelled out in these papers 
is thak society can be thought of as having only two fundamental 
resources-the stock of wealth inherited from past productive activity and 
not consumed, and the available time of all members of society. Wealth is 
used here in a substantially broader sense than the tangible capital stock 
used in the production of goods and services in the market. While such 
wealth is clearly part of the total, a broader notion of wealth incorporates 
human capital assets (skills, health status), stocks of organizational capital 
(networks of associations within business organizations, within families, 
within neighborhoods, etc.), stocks of sociopolitical assets (the judicial 
system, the representational system, etc.), stocks of environmental assets 
(natural resource endowments, air and water quality), and stocks of ab- 
stract knowledge not embodied in existing capital equipment. Thus the set 
of stocks relevant to the generation of utility include any asset that condi- 
tions either the efficiency of. or the satisfactions associated with, various 
time uses. 
In this model, time can be used as in the household production 
literature-for the production of market goods and services (the x’s in 
Equations 1 and 2), for the production of household outputs (the Z’s in 
Equation 3), for household maintenance activities (generally ignored in the 
literature), or for leisure activities (also z’s in Equation 3). The general 
idea embodied in this model of utility is that the production of goods and 
services in the market is determined by capital stocks and labor market 
time, that market goods, nonmarket time and stocks of capital affect the 
efficiency with which households can produce commodities, and that flows 
of market goods and services and of household produced commodities, 
along with capital stocks, condition the satisfactions (let us call them pro- 
cess benefits) associated with activities. 
One of the interesting features of this way of thinking about the utility 
function is that all of the tangible and intangible outputs of various produc- 
tion processes, whether they take place in the market or within households, 
represent inputs into the intrinsic satisfactions (process benefits) associated 
with one or another activity, or else they represent goods and services that 
add to the stock of wealth available for the production of future satisfac- 
tions. But what is not so obvious is that the flows of all tangible or intangible 
products, which represent the extrinsic outputs from productive activity, 
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disappear from the utility function, either because they are fully repre- 
sented by the process benefits obtained from one or another activity or 
because they add to capital stocks. 
An illustration may make the point clearer. Labor market time and 
capital stocks go into the production of food available in grocery stores, the 
time of household members in conjunction with market-produced food goes 
into the production of meals, and meals go into the production of two 
further types of output-the process benefits from eating and any change in 
health status associated with nourishment. Should we count the process 
benefits from eating along with the nonmarket time and household stocks 
that transform raw food into meals, or the labor market time and business 
capital stocks that go into the production of raw food? The answer seems to 
be no, anymore than we would include in the GNP the automobile that was 
eventually purchased by consumers, the component parts like fenders and 
wheels that were produced by the automobile assembly plant, the steel that 
went into the fenders and the rubber that went into the tires, and the iron 
ore that went into the steel. That would clearly by double-counting. Once 
we count the car, we ought not to count the components as well. The 
solution, standard in National Income accounting, is to exclude from net 
output any purchased product that represents a production input, and to 
count only the value-added at each stage of production. 
But that is no more double-counting than adding up the process benefits 
from eating along with the time and resources going into the transforma- 
tions of food into meals or the time and resources going into the production 
of food. If we have properly measured the process benefits associated with 
eating meals, we have also measured the contribution to utility of the 
intermediate tangible outcomes (meals and raw food) as well. But what we 
have not measured are any process benefits associated with the various 
production processes, along with the fact that eating meals is not only a 
source of current utility but may also be a source of future utility because it 
has a possible impact on health status. In short, the flow of process benefit is 
the value-added equivalent of the household production function. 
Generalizing this proposition across all production activities leads to the 
conclusion that accurate measurement of the process benefits associated 
with all activities fully comprehends the sources of current utility from 
goods and commodities, and adding to that any current or future satisfac- 
tion associated with the various capital stocks in the system fully compre- 
hends all potential sources of utility. 
Not only is it true that all the tangible product flows of society enter the 
utility function by conditioning the process benefits from some activity, but 
it is also true that every activity contains an element of process benefits. 
Economists have typically thought of process benefits as largely associated 
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with leisure. After all, the conventional wisdom is that consumers work in 
order to earn income so that they can enjoy leisure. But productive activity, 
both within the market and the home, also produces a flow of process 
benefits (which may be negative, if one thinks of utility of having a true zero 
point). The only difference between production activities and consumption 
activities is that production activities have both a flow of extrinsic products 
as well as a flow of process benefits, while many leisure activities can be 
thought of as having only the latter.lX 
Formally, the utility structure implied by this view of the world is repre- 
sented by Equations 4 to 4.3. 
U = u(xi, Z;, 6, Kc,, K,) (4) 
where the xi are market-produced goods and services, the Z; are household 
produced commodities, the ti are time uses, K, is the household’s initial 
capital stock, and K, is the end of period capital stock. 
Since the xi are all inputs into the Z;, and the Zi are all inputs into the 
process benefits from some time use, all that is left in the utility function are 
the process benefits from all time uses, PB,, the current period satisfactions 
from those capital stocks that yield utility directly and independently of any 
time use, Ko*, and the contribution to future utility represented by the end- 
of-period capital stock K1. Thus: 
U = u(PB;, Kc,*, K,) (4.1) 
subject to the constraints of beginning period capital stock and total avail- 
able time. I4 
Kc,, Kc,* (4.2) 
given 
T = $, t; (4.3) 
The notion that activities are the basic source of utility turns out to have 
clearly identifiable historical roots. As LoewensteitP) notes in his literature 
survey, Edgeworth in Mathematical Psychics conceived of the individual as 
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an enormously complex machine whose purpose was to convert inputs such 
as time and food and consumption goods into pleasure, and the same theme 
was echoed several decades later by Irving Fisher, who wrote: 
These and other illustrations will show that, if we include the body as a 
transforming instrument, while we must credit with their respective ser- 
vice all these outside agencies, such as food, clothing. dwelling, furniture. 
ornaments, and other articles, which, as it were, bombard a man’s sensory 
system, we must also at the same time debit the body with these same 
items. In this case, the only surviving credit items after these equal debits 
and credits are cancelled are the resulting satisfactions in the human mind. 
In other words; in order that the external would should become effective 
to man, the human body must be considered as the last transforming 
instrument. Just as there is a gradual transformation ofservices through the 
farm, flour mill, and bakery, so there is a gradual transformution within the 
human body itself. It is a sort of factory, the products of which are the only 
uncancelled income of the consumer (Fisher,““’ p. 167).“ 
Assume for the moment that it is logically consistent to think about utility 
and well-being as fully represented by the flow of process benefits associ- 
ated with a comprehensive set of activities, in addition to the current and 
future satisfactions represented by various kinds of capital stock. Does that 
framework tell us anything useful? More importantly, is there any way in 
which one could imagine implementing the idea empirically? 
DIRECT MEASUREMENTS OF UTILITY 
The division of utility into a component associated with time uses and 
another component associated with capital stocks of one kind or another is 
a useful starting point. We can clearly measure time uses, at least in 
principle. Whether we can measure the utility associated with time uses is 
another question. In principle, one could imagine measurements taking the 
form of attaching a perfectly calibrated “utility meter” to the appropriate 
part of a consumer’s brain, and monitoring the level of utility associated 
with activity as consumers proceed to do various things throughout the day 
and the year. That procedure depends, of course, on the existence of a 
utility meter that uniquely maps actual utility; otherwise, it would be open 
to the objection that some characteristic of brain cell activity was being 
monitored, without it necessarily having anything to do with utility.‘” 
Assume that problem away for the moment. It is obviqusly possible to 
measure utility in the population at large either by continuous monitoring of 
the utility flows associated with activities, or by sampling utility at randomly 
selected intervals of time throughout the day or the year. That procedure 
would not get around any of the problems associated with interpersonal 
utility comparisons, unless one is willing to assume that the brain monitor 
utilized an exactly equivalent utility metrics across all individuals. But the 
Rethinking Utility Theory 167 
answer seems to be that, provided one can measure activities and measure 
the utilities associated with activities, the part of utility associated with 
activities could in principle be analyzed. 
The part of utility associated with capital stocks is equally problematic. It 
is clear enough that this is a potentially important component of utility, and 
it may be that the utility involved in the existence or ownership of capital 
stocks is harder to capture because it has the character of a pervasive sense 
of satisfaction arising from some state of the world rather than being 
associated with some process or activity. But one could easily imagine a 
survey that asked consumers about the state of their marriage, the state of 
their durable goods, their perception of the state of the world, their satisfac- 
tion with the income distribution, etc. 
In fact, both types of measurement actually exist. As a by-product of a 
national survey of time use among American households, motivated princi- 
pally by a desire to understand the character of nonmarket activities in 
households, we obtained not only measurements of actual time uses among 
a probability sample of U.S. consumers, but also a measure of the process 
benefits associated with a subset of activities. The data do not come very 
close to representing a “utility meter” reading of the sort described, and 
they do not represent the instantaneous satisfaction obtained from momen- 
tary activities. Rather, they represent statements about the average amount 
of satisfaction from activities with descriptive labels like watching televi- 
sion, going to the movies, playing sports or games, cleaning the house, 
working at your job, taking care of children, etc. Thus, they are not quite 
mapped into instantaneous utilities associated with current activities. 
As to the capital stocks, sociologists, social psychologists (and even a few 
economists) have in recent decades developed a keen interest in what are 
called “Quality of Life” measurements. On inspection, these turn out to be 
largely measures of satisfaction with various kinds of “capital stocks,” 
defined broadly as above, although some of them are closer to satisfaction 
with activities than with capital stocks. But reported satisfaction with mar- 
riage, friendships, financial security, durable good stocks, etc., have been 
examined in a series of studies (Campbell, Converse and Rogers,‘“‘) Brad- 
burn,@) Cantril & Roll,(“) Andrews and Withey, and Juster, Courant and 
Dow (31) 17 
Whether this way of thinking about well-being is useful or not has to be 
determined in the usual way. Those who think it is useful produce analyses 
based on it, and those analyses either influence the way other economists 
think about related problems or they do not. But some interesting insights 
can be obtained from the existing measurement. We focus on the activity 
measurements, and on the intrinsic satisfactions associated with them. 
Measurement of the capital stock utility flows is a different story, and are 
ignored in this paper. 
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As indicated, relatively crude data of this sort were obtained in the 
mid-1970s and in the early 198Os, as part of national studies of time alloca- 
tion among American households. Twenty-four hour time diary data were 
obtained from a random sample of American adults. Respondents were 
also asked to rate a comprehensive list of activities on a 10 to 0 scale, with 
10 characterizing an activity from which the respondent derived a great deal 
of satisfaction (enjoyment was the actual term), 0 an activity associated with 
a good deal of distaste (dislike was the actual term), and 5 an activity to 
which respondents were indifferent-don’t care about it one way or the 
other was the description. On a cardinal utility scale, 5 can be thought of as 
equivalent to a zero point, with higher numbers being positive and lower 
numbers negative. 
The basic data are displayed in Table 1, ordered by the mean population 
values of the process benefit scores in the mid-1970s survey. We show 
activity categories, mean process benefits in 1975 and 1982, the “reliability” 
proportion (described below), and the mean amount of time spent on the 




“Reliability” in 1975 
Activity N 1975 1982 Proportion (hours/day) 
Talking with children 312 9.16 8.98 .80 .07 
Care of children 312 8.87 a.74 .a2 .50 
Trips with children 311 a.87 a.72 .74 .03 
Games with children 308 8.62 a.24 .74 .05 
Talking with friends 678 8.38 a.27 .66 .2a 
Going on trips, outings 657 8.24 8.17 .67 .75 
Job 397 8.02 7.79 .72 5.03 
Home entertainment 662 7.76 7.54 .62 .79 
Reading books, magazines 668 7.60 7.49 .67 .31 
Going to church 6.31 7.23 7.28 .66 .17 
Reading newspapers 675 7.17 7.10 .63 .24 
Making things for house 635 6.78 6.47 .57 .17 
Playing sports 606 6.76 6.23 .56 .12 
Going to movies, plays 629 6.65 6.38 .52 .lO 
Gardening 642 6.55 6.27 .60 .15 
Cooking 668 6.17 6.13 .60 .70 
Television 677 5.93 6.00 .62 2.01 
Other shopping 673 5.69 5.30 .57 .02 
Housing repairs and alterations 635 5.11 4.94 .57 .19 
Work, school organizations 587 5.00 5.13 .50 .27 
Grocery shopping 673 4.57 4.55 .56 :34 
Cleaning house 672 4.22 4.18 .57 1.13 
Sources. Basic data from luster, “Preferences for Work and Leisure,” in Juster and Staiford.‘” 
Note: The “reliability” proportion is the fraction of the sample giving the same responw to the proce3, benefits 
questIon, plus or minus one scale point, from different surveys taken six month? apart m 1982. 
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activity, measured in hours per day. Not all activities are included (e.g., 
sleep and personal care are excluded), hence the total time is less than 24 
hours. These data provide a number of points of interest. 
1. The rank ordering and the quantitative differences among activities indi- 
cate considerable stability in the process benefits from activities. There is 
hardly any change in rank ordering between two periods seven years apart, 
and the mean values across the population are very similar. 
2. The reliability of the data at the level of the individual is quite high. The 
proportion who gave the same scale response plus or minus one, separated 
by a six month span in the 1982 study, range from half the sample to over 
80 percent. 
3. Activities that are interactive, i.e., that involve other people, tend to 
dominate the top half of the rankings, while activities that are not interac- 
tive or less interactive tend to dominate the bottom half of the rankings. 
4. The process benefits associated with paid employment outrank all but a 
few leisure activities, and clearly have a mean value that is above the mean 
for leisure activities, the latter weighted by actual time spent in the 
activity. 
5. The process benefits associated with work in the home, with the exception 
of childcare, tend to rank at the bottom of the list, and clearly have a mean 
value well below that of paid employment. 
The chief surprise in these data is the next-to-last finding-that average 
process benefits from work outrank average process benefits from leisure. 
After all, standard utility theory has always argued that it is the combina- 
tion of income from work (the extrinsic rewards) plus the intrinsic rewards 
from leisure that go into the utility function, and that the intrinsic rewards 
from work are negative-people need to be induced to work by the pay- 
ment of wages, and the function of wages is to overcome the distaste for 
work.lX But these data present quite a different picture. They suggest that 
the intrinsic rewards from work are, on average, at least as high as the 
intrinsic rewards from leisure. If that result is taken at face value, it suggests 
that economists need to do a major rethinking of the elements that go into 
individual utility functions.” 
Since that result is counter-intuitive, we designed some methodological 
tests of the intrinsic satisfaction data in the study conducted in the early 
1980s. Basically we took two activities-work for pay in the market, and 
cleaning the house-and tried to determine whether the responses we were 
getting could be explained by the respondent’s inability to distinguish 
extrinsic from intrinsic rewards. That is, were the relatively high rankings of 
work for pay on the process benefits scale a simple consequence of the fact 
that our respondents were reporting that they liked their jobs because they 
were well paid? 
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The test was to ask respondents, after they had provided scale values for 
paid work and cleaning the house, why they had made the judgments they 
had just given us ? Specifically, we asked: What is it about your job, or 
about cleaning the house, that makes you rate it a ? Responses 
were then coded into various categories, some clearly reflecting extrinsic 
rather than intrinsic rewards, some equally clearly reflecting intrinsic re- 
wards only. 
Statistical tests on the data showed unambiguously that the intrinsic 
satisfactions reported by respondents as associated with paid employment 
were not contaminated because respondents mixed up some of the extrinsic 
rewards with the intrinsic ones. People who gave relatively high scores to 
paid employment reported that they were thinking about the nonmonetary 
aspects of the work environment-the people they worked with, the chal- 
lenge or learning opportunities involved, the amount of supervision and 
responsibility, whether the job was boring or repetitious, etc. Reference to 
the financial characteristics of the job did not distinguish respondents who 
provided relatively high scores from those who provided relatively low 
scores (Juster(2X.2y)). 
Interestingly enough, while contamination of the intrinsic satisfaction 
data with extrinsic reward considerations did not appear to be a factor in 
interpreting the paid employment responses, it was clearly a major factor in 
explaining responses to the “cleaning the house” data. When asked why 
they had provided the ranking they did, the single most important factor for 
those who provided relatively high rankings was that they “felt good about 
having a clean house.” That is clearly an extrinsic reward, not a process 
benefit. Adjusting the data for respondents who thus misinterpreted the 
question dropped the overall population mean score by a full scale point, 
thus making the gap between the process benefits from paid employment 
with those from work in the home even larger than shown by the data in the 
table. 
SOME IMPLICATIONS 
Is there any independent evidence suggesting that these results reflect a real 
phenomenon rather than some kind of socially determined intrinsic satisfac- 
tion story derived from a self-report scale ?2” To begin with, we have already 
noted that these results do not necessarily negate the proposition that 
people are willing to trade off work for leisure at the margin. The data 
clearly relate to average process benefits from particular activities, and do 
not represent marginal process benefits-the satisfaction obtained from the 
last minute or hour of a particular activity. Thus, process benefits from 
work could be very high on average, but could be very low at the margin- 
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that would be true if the function drops off very sharply as work hours 
increase. Thus, the data can be interpreted as saying that many individuals 
prefer an activity pattern that includes an element of work for pay, not that 
individuals generally prefer to work longer hours than they now do. The 
data are thus not inconsistent with the observed long-term decline in work 
hour and the associated growth in leisure hours. 
Moreover, the notion that intrinsic rewards from work are relatively high 
helps to explain a number of anomalies that represent puzzles for the 
conventional analysis of utility-maximizing behavior. 
l A number of studies have looked at what happens to people who 
win major prizes in lotteries. (KaplarP’)) The typical result is that 
most people continue to work, often at jobs that contribute only 
marginally to their total income, taking account of the value of the 
lottery prize. 
l Of the individuals and families eligible for various forms of welfare 
assistance, a substantial fraction choose not to avail themselves of 
welfare payments and opt instead to work at jobs that yield total 
income no better than that obtainable through welfare. Such obser- 
vations have often been explained on the grounds that people are ill- 
informed, or that they want to avoid the social stigma attached to 
welfare, or that they are investing in future income by building up 
labor market experience. But a simpler explanation is that people 
have a strong preference for work as an activity. 
l Over the last 60 or so years, there has been a strong and consistent 
growth in women’s labor force participation, usually explained in 
economic models as the consequence of the relative growth in 
market wage rates compared to the value of nonmarket activities. 
That story has always been unsatisfactory. Labor force participation 
growth rates have been just as strong in periods when wage rates 
have been rising slowly or not at all as when wage rates have been 
rising rapidly, and there has never been any evidence that the gap 
between productivity in the market and productivity in the home 
has been increasing. A simpler explanation is that work in the 
market is associated with significant intrinsic rewards, and quite 
possibly that these rewards have been shifting upward over time as 
working wives have become a more socially acceptable phenome- 
non. 
The general proposition advanced here-that the intrinsic rewards from 
activities are an essential ingredient in individual and household utility 
functions-has other potentially far-reaching implications for a variety of 
economic and social phenomenon. For example, it is widely argued that 
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many work environments could be more efficiently organized on a cottage 
industry basis-electronic communication devices make it unnecessary for 
people to travel to a common work location, and both communication and 
decision-making processes can conserve on time by creating technically 
efficient work environments in people’s homes. The evidence that interac- 
tive activities are more strongly preferred than noninteractive activities 
makes this vision of the future a dubious one, except for special occasions 
and special circumstances. Generally speaking, most members of the work 
force are unlikely to find that type of work environment very satisfactory, 
since it precludes the kind of interaction that appears to underlie the 
preference data. 
A good many commercial enterprises have adopted the view that serving 
consumers with technology is a more efficient way to provide a variety of 
services-banking, shopping, etc. To the extent that preferences for inter- 
active activities are an important phenomenon in the market, those techni- 
cally more efficient arrangements will not be adopted by a good many 
consumers if they are only slightly less costly. 
While the data suggest that a set of activities that includes work for pay in 
the market will often be preferred to a set that does not, they certainly do 
not suggest that people have preferences for an activity package that in- 
cludes a standard (40 hours) work weeks. In fact, the long historic trend of 
decreasing work hours suggests precisely the opposite, and has usually been 
interpreted to mean that people prefer leisure to work at the margin of 
choice. An interpretation consistent with the historical trend, and also with 
the data and theory discussed above, is that a great many people prefer an 
activity package which includes some modest amount of paid work, but not 
necessarily full-time paid work. But the labor market is such that part-time 
jobs are often hard to find and often regarded by employers as a more costly 
way to organize work activities. If these preference data are an accurate 
reflection of true preferences, an employer able to reconfigure work flows 
to capitalize on the demand for part-time work would be able to attract a 
productive labor force at relatively modest wage rates, and make a profit bj 
so doing, 
SUMMARY 
This reformulation of utility theory in terms of satisfactions derived from 
activities and those derived from wealth is an insight of considerable poten- 
tial usefulness. It is simpler and more general than the present formulation, 
it provides useful insights into behaviors that are difficult to explain with 
present theory, and it predicts future behaviors that existing theory does 
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not. Its weakness, from the viewpoint of traditional theory, is that it relies 
directly on subjective phenomena that cannot be directly observed, that 
cannot be traded between participants in a market (except indirectly), and 
whose implications cannot easily be contradicted by observed behavior. But 
some of those problems exist also for the current theory of consumer 
choice, which also cannot easily be contradicted by observed behavior. 
Perhaps the best way to assess this theoretical structure is that it provides 
an accounting framework for describing and measuring well-being, both 
among individuals and societies, that in principle has great generality and 
power. The framework involves the measurement of subjective variables, 
which have never been a great favorite of economists. While variables of 
this sort contain measurement errors and interpretive ambiguities that are 
not present in objective variables, that might be better seen as an oppor- 
tunity and a challenge rather than as a proscription. 
NOTES 
Juster is Research Scientist, Institute for Social Research, and Professor of Economics, 
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paper were received from Charles Brown, Greg Dow, Roberta Miller, Albert Rees, 
and Hal Varian. As indicated. this paper draws heavily on previous collaborative work 
with Paul Courant and Greg Dow. 
The introductory material in the paper leans heavily on the excellent summaries of the 
historical development of utility theory provided by Stiglerc”‘,““) and Meeks,c4-” espe- 
cially the former. A recent Ph.D dissertation by LoewensteincaZ) provides some inter- 
esting insights into the intertemporal optimization aspects of utility theory. 
The literature on utility theory has been enormous over the years, and includes many 
of the profession’s heavyweights. Nobel prize winners, for example, are prominent 
among major contributors (Hicks, Arrow, Samuelson, Stigler. Friedman), and if Nobel 
prizes had been around earlier, Menger. Marshall, Jevons, Pareto. Walras, Slutksy. 
and Edgeworth would surely have received one. 
This is technically not quite accurate. Declining marginal utility is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for an optimum solution that involves the consumption of multiple 
goods rather than only a single good. In the two-good case, the marginal utility of one 
good can be rising as long as the marginal utility of the other good is falling “rapidly 
enough,” and the optimum combination will still involve consuming some of each 
good. 
There are important differences between the conditions for optimality with cardinally 
measurable utility and ordinally measured preferences. The first has a unique optimum 
and a true zero point. The second has the much weaker property of being at a 
maximum point on some utility surface without having to say how much higher than 
other reachable surfaces it actually is. The first is generally inconsistent with rising 
marginal utility, while for the second declining marginal utility is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for equilibrium. Finally. the first requires strong assumptions 
about measurability, while the second does not., 







Whether consumers can more plausibly be judged to be able to make the distinctions 
required by preferences ordering than those required by marginal utility calculations is 
a different issue. To quote one of the most quotable of the participants, Dennis 
Robertson (reported in Meek+) commented that: 
In slitting the throat of diminishing marginal utility, Hicks and Allen did 
not leave us destitute: they gave us in its place a creature which every 
teacher of economics now knows as the marginal rate of substitution. The 
consumer, it seems, must not go about burdened with the knowledge, or 
belief, that a little more beef or a little more beer would add so much to 
his satisfaction; but he may go about with the knowledge, or belief, that 
he would be ready to go without so much beef for so much extra beer, and 
likewise for any other two commodities you like to name (Robertson’5”1). 
There was not only a good deal of discussion in the literature as to whether the utilities 
yielded by the consumption of x, . . . x,, were independent of each other, but a more 
global level, whether the utility of consumer A’s consumption bundle is independent of 
consumer B’s consumption (Edgeworth,“‘) Mill,““’ Kaldor.“” Fisher,“‘) Pigou,“” Due- 
senberryC’3J). The general conclusion was that the utilities from consumption are not 
generally independent, either at the level of an individual consumer’s bundle of 
consumption goods or at the more global level of the total consumption of different 
individuals, although the latter conclusion is often ignored in the current literature. 
A plausible reason is that economists tend to think of the labor force as being 
determined by population characteristics, and work hours as being determined by 
employers. 
Of course, wage rates also came to be perceived as a choice variable. One could invest 
in productivity-related skills by deciding to spend time in school, or by accepting a job 
with a large training component (Mincer”“‘). 
The literature does contain some suggestion that work activity per se does not neces- 
sarily produce negative utility. That is certainly true of the very early discussion in 
Jevons@“), and can be found in more recent discussions of labor supply (Rees”hl) In 
addition, there is substantial literature on compensating wage differentials, which 
implies that the direct utility from work varies according to job characteristics 
(Brown,‘Y’ R. S. Smith,@‘) and Duncan & Holmlund”“). 
J. R. Hicks, who was an early enthusiast for preference ordering, thought otherwise in 
his later writing, seeing marginal utility calculations as closer to what consumers 
actually do than marginal rate of substitution calculations (Hicks,““). 
This change is usually interpreted (Loewenstein, “I) Meeks”“) as reflecting a desire to 
depsychologize utility theory on the grounds that the fewer the assumptions the better 
the theory. Loewenstein interprets it as reflecting increased uneasiness on the part of 
many economists with the shaky psychological foundations of cardinally measurable 
utility. Stigler, (Oh) notes that many of the big guns in the early development of utility 
theory (e.g., Pareto, Slutsky) viewed the detaching of the theory from psychological 
underpinnings as an important simplification. 
It is far from clear that consumers think of future consumption as being worth less 
than an equivalent amount of current consumption. The topic has been much debated 
in the literature, with a number of writers arguing that future consumption was every 
bit as valuable as present consumption except for the fact that it was uncertain, and 
therefore might not take place (e.g., JevonsCZhl). 










A different departure from the goods-leisure model was introduced by Lancaster, who 
argued that characteristics of products rather than products were what produced utility. 
Thus consumers were paying for the functions performed by goods, not for the goods 
themselves (Lancaster’““). 
This is obviously a gross oversimplification of the development of utility theory. For 
example, it entirely omits the spirited discussion in the literature about whether 
individual utility functions could be compared or aggregated (Marshall,“” Pigou,‘“’ 
Jevons(2b’); whether aggregation of utility functions necessarily yielded consistency in 
social choices (Arrow, (‘1 Bergson”‘) whether any social policy change could be shown to 
be an improvement in utility terms (Hicks,‘z’) Arrow,‘z-2’ Little,‘“’ Samuelson,‘“” Rob- 
bins(r7)) and the relation between National Income aggregates and societal well-being 
(Kuznets, w Scitovsky, Ih2) Nordhaus and Tobin, I”) Griliches,LX’) Mishan,‘“) Ruggles,““’ 
Kendrick,““) Juster, [*‘) Eisner et al.“‘)). 
In addition, there is the extensive literature concerned with whether consumers 
maximize expected utility in situations involving risky outcomes. The von Neumann- 
Morgenstern axioms’“’ are the standard view, recently challenged by the prospect 
theory axioms (consumers are risk-averse when it comes to prospective gains, risk- 
loving when it comes to prospective losses) of Kahneman and Tversky.“” Friedman and 
SavageC’9’ and Arrow”’ are important contributors to this topic. 
It would be well not to push the latter point too hard-that leisure activities contain 
only process benefits, and have no extrinsic outcome of value. Many-perhaps most- 
leisure activities are quite likely to yield some enhancement of a capital stock of one 
kind or other-health status, the stock of relationships represented by marriage, 
friendships, etc. 
A set of production and investment constraints that affect the Z; and K, are also needed 
in the system. 
The quote from Fisher not only portends what we have called process benefits, but also 
clearly foreshadows the notion of the household as a utility producing factory. The 
utility factory theme, which is more of a return to the Benthamite tradition of focusing 
on utility flows than an elaboration of the preference ordering notion, reappears in 
modern form in Stigler and Becker.le7’ 
That argument can be found repeatedly in the earlier literature concerned with meth- 
ods of measuring cardinal utility, e.g., Robbins.““’ 
A consistent finding from the Quality of Life studies is that the most important 
dimensions of satisfaction with one’s life as a whole turns out to be noneconomic 
factors---relationships with family and friends-rather than economic or financial ones. 
The argument has always been carefully put in marginal terms--the wage rate is 
needed to overcome the distaste for the last hour of work-and goes back at least to 
Stanley Jevons. 
Although the result described here is technically consistent with the traditional theory, 
it seems unlikely to me that the relevant functions have the necessary shapes. Tradi- 
tional theory equates the marginal utility of consumption, UC’, with the marginal utility 
of leisure, U,‘. The marginal utility of consumptian is equal to the marginal utility of 
income, iJ ,.‘, plus the marginal utility of work, U,‘, presumed to be negative in 
equilibrium. Thus at the point of choice, U,’ = UC’ = U,.’ + (I,,,‘, where all the terms 
except U,’ are presumed to be positive. 
The data indicate that the average utility of U,,.’ is higher than the average utility of 
U,‘. Since the maximum utility yielded by the first minute (or hour) for all possible 
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activities is unlikely to be associated with work (there are hundreds of leisure activities, 
and at least one should represent the maximum), and since leisure activities can be 
easily substituted for each other as their marginal utility declines, it takes a very 
peculiar shape for the (I,,. function to get the result that we observe and still maintain 
the marginal equality conditions shown above. A more plausible interpretation is that 
disequilibrium often exists, probably because of labor market rigidities on the demand 
side. For example, the absence of a rich and continuous set of market opportunities to 
work 5, 7.5, 10 . . . hours per week at a wage consistent with one’s productivity. 
20. Quite a lot of analysis has been done using the process benefits data to either describe 
or model behavior, most of which is reported in Juster and Stafford (Eds.). 7’imc. 
Goods, and Well- Being. “‘) Papers include: Chapter 13, Preferences for Work and 
Leisure, Juster”“‘; Chapter 16, Goods, Time, and Well-Being: The Joint Dependence 
Problem, Greg K. Dow and Juster”?); and Chapter 17, Constraints and Complemen- 
tarities in Time Use, M. Hill and Juster.‘?‘) In addition, the process benefits data have 
been examined by Juster in “Changes in Work, Leisure, and Well-Being for Men and 
Women” (under review),“” and in “The Distribution of Well-Being among House- 
holds” (Juster”“‘). 
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